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THE FUTURE OF THE DOCTRINE OF
NECESSITY AND CRITICAL-VENDOR
PAYMENTS IN CHAPTER 11 CASES
ALAN

N.

RESNICK*

Abstract: This Article explores the history and justification for the
doctrine of necessity in Chapter 11 cases. It discusses the doctrine's
gradual narrowing, due to appellate courts' reluctance to permit payment
of prepetition debts or recognize courts' authority to authorize such
payments. The Article analyzes the effect of recent amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code on the doctrine and confirms that there is uncertainty
regarding the propriety of payment of certain prebankruptcy debts. The
Article proposes that the Code be amended to clarify the extent to which
the doctrine of necessity applies in Chapter 11 cases and asserts that
courts should recognize different standards depending on the type of
debt being repaid. Finally, this Article argues that courts should have
discretion to authorize payments in extraordinary circumstances when
they follow procedural safeguards.
INTRODUCTION

The recognition and application of the doctrine of necessity, especially with respect to the treatment of so-called "critical vendors,"
have been the subject of controversy in Chapter 11 reorganization
cases in recent years. The doctrine of necessity is a judge-made rule
that courts rely upon to justify permitting a debtor in possession in a
Chapter 11 case, prior to the confirmation of a plan of reorganization, to pay certain creditors the full amount of their prebankruptcy
unsecured claims. This special treatment is, in theory, reserved for
* © 2005, Alan N. Resnick, Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law;, Of Counsel, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson LLP, New York; member of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the
Judicial Conference of the United States; member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
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copies of this article for use by nonprofit educational institutions, so long as the copies are
distributed at or below cost, the author and journal are identified, and proper notice of
copyright is affixed to each copy.
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those vendors and other creditors who are critical to the survival of
the debtor because of the goods or services they provide.
Frequently permitted by bankruptcy courts in response to motions made on the first day of the case-sometimes with only a few
hours' notice to the United States trustee and a handful of parties in
interest-the appellate courts tend to narrow the availability and
scope of the doctrine of necessity in bankruptcy cases. Most recently,
Congress enacted the most comprehensive and sweeping bankruptcy
legislation in more than twenty-five years, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (the "2005 Act" or
."2005 amendments").' Though the recent legislation does not directly
address the viability of, or limitations on, the doctrine of necessity,
several provisions of the 2005 Act are likely to have an impact on the
use of the doctrine in future cases. In addition to these judicial and
legislative developments, proposed amendments to the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure have been published which, in reaction to
criticism regarding the lack of notice and process safeguards, will have
an impact on the procedural aspects of the doctrine of necessity.
Although predicting the future significance or resolution of any
controversial issue in bankruptcy jurisprudence is a foolish endeavor,
this Article will nonetheless address the likely future of the doctrine of
necessity in Chapter 11 reorganization cases, taking into account recent judicial and legislative developments and the pending amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
I. WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY?
One of the most fundamental principles of American bankruptcy
law is the equal treatment of similarly situated creditors. The Bankruptcy Code contains numerous provisions designed to achieve such
equality.2 For example, only similarly situated creditors may be placed
in the same class under a plan of reorganization, 3 and the same treatment must be afforded to each and every member of that class unless a
IPub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCPA] (to be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
2 The current law of bankruptcy is found in Title 11 of the United States Code. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2000). Its foundation is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (effective Oct. 1, 1979) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101
et seq. (2000)). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is typically referred to as the "Bankruptcy Code" or the "Code." References in this work to the "Bankruptcy Code" or the
"Code" are to Title 11 of the United States Code as amended through April 20, 2005.
3 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a).
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creditor receiving less favorable treatment consents. 4 Furthermore, if a
non-accepting class becomes the subject of a "cram down" request-by
which the court may confirm a plan notwithstanding the rejection of a
class of creditors-the Bankruptcy Code prohibits the confirmation
unless the plan does not "discriminate unfairly" against the nonaccepting class.5 That standard means that the plan may not treat an
accepting class more favorably than the non-accepting class of equal
rank unless the court finds that the discrimination is fair under the circumstances. Also, if an insolvent debtor pays an unsecured claim within
ninety days before bankruptcy, and the payment enables the creditor to
receive more than the creditor would have received from the debtor's
bankruptcy estate if the debtor had not made the payment and had
filed a chapter 7 petition, the payment may be recovered by the trustee
or debtor in possession as a voidable preference. 6 The theoretical
predicate for providing for the recovery of the preference is, again, the
equality of treatment of similarly situated creditors. In addition, the
automatic stay under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits
creditors from obtaining an unfair advantage over others by enforcing
collection rights after filing a bankruptcy petition. 7 All of these provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are designed to give similarly situated
creditors the same or substantially similar treatment in bankruptcy.
This principal of treating creditors equally when a debtor is in
bankruptcy is violated when an insolvent debtor in possession in
Chapter 11 is allowed to pay a creditor, in full, with respect to a prebankruptcy general unsecured claim before a plan of reorganization
is confirmed. So why permit it? Why should a bankruptcy court order
that the debtor may pay prebankruptcy unsecured claims in full for
certain creditors, but not for other creditors, leaving the latter group
with recoveries of only a few cents on the dollar under a confirmed
plan of reorganization? The easy answer is that, in certain situations, it
is necessary for the survival of the debtor's business and for the successful reorganization of the debtor. This, in turn, inures to the
benefit of all parties in interest, including employees who keep their
jobs, vendors and others who may be dependent on the continuing
existence of the debtor for future business, equity holders who may
reap economic benefits when the business is rehabilitated, and gen4 Id.§ 1123(a) (4).

5Id.§ 1129(b) (1).
6 BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1213(a) (1), 119 Stat. 23, 194 (to be codified at, and
amending, 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)).
7 11 U.S.C. § 362, amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
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eral unsecured creditors whose recovery will be based on the going
concern value of the reorganized business, rather than on the scrap
value of assets resulting from forced liquidation at auction sales.
Aside from the fact that, at least until the amendments enacted in
2005,8 there has been no provision of the Bankruptcy Code that expressly authorizes the payment of prebankruptcy debts before
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, critics of the doctrine of necessity
have argued that there is no effective way to determine who, in fact, is
a "critical vendor."9 Skeptics are particularly concerned about the lack
of adequate procedural protection for other unsecured creditors who
wish to challenge the application of the doctrine of necessity. As any
experienced Chapter 11 practitioner knows, there is usually inadequate opportunity to challenge emergency motions made on the first
day of the case that result in court orders on the same day or within a
few days thereafter.
The doctrine of necessity-that is, court-approved payment of
unsecured prebankruptcy claims before a Chapter 11 plan is
confirmed-has its origin in nineteenth-century railroad receivership
cases.10 Two similar doctrines developed at that time. First, railroad
receiverships in the late 1800s recognized an equitable rule of priority, known as the "six months rule," which authorized receivers to pay
the unpaid claims of "operating creditors" arising within the sixmonth period immediately preceding the receivership case.11 To be
entitled to such payments, a creditor had to show that the obligation
to pay was incurred within six months before the receivership pro8 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code made by BAPCPA, which, in general, are effective in bankruptcy cases commenced on or after October 17, 2005, are discussed later in
this article.
9 Christopher D. Hunt, Note, Not-So-Critical Vendors: Redefining CriticalVendor Orders, 93
Ky. L.J. 915, 924 (2004); Robert A. Morris, The Case Against "Critical Vendor" Motions, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2003, http://www.abiworld.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Publica
tions/OnlineABIJournal/Archivel/ABI-journalArchives.htm
(click on "2003," then
"September," then follow "FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: The Case Against 'Critical Vendor'
Motions" hyperlink).
10 See B&W Enter. Inc. v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B&W Enter. Inc.), 713 F.2d 534, 536
(9th Cir. 1983) (discussing the origins of the doctrine of necessity and the parallel doctrine called the six months rule); In re Boston & Me. Corp., 634 F.2d 1359, 1366 (1st Cit.
1980) (discussing same).
11Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its Parameters,73
MARQ. L. REv. 1, 4 (1989); AndrewJ. Currie & Sean McCann, Hold on to Those Payments, Critical Vendors: Capital Factors v. Kmart, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2003, http://www.abi
world.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Publications/Online-ABIJournal/Archivel/ABI-Jou
rnalArchives.htm (click on "2003," then "June,"then follow "FEATURE ARTICLE: Hold on
to Those Payments, Critical Vendors: Capital Factors v. Kmart" hyperlink).
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ceeding commenced, in which case it was given an equitable priority
over other creditors and was entitled to payment.' 2 Such payments
were made even before mortgagees were paid.1 3 The justification for
the doctrine was that it would be inequitable to operating creditors,
supplying the necessary services and products for the railroad's continued existence and revenue generation, if the resulting operating
revenue benefited secured creditors, who were not entitled to the operating revenue of the railroad until a receiver was appointed.' 4 In
essence, the rule gave prebankruptcy unsecured claims of vendors
and other operating creditors that arose within six months before the
receivership priority in payment over secured creditors.
When the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was enacted, the six months
rule became part of railroad reorganization cases under section 77(b)
of the Act.' 5 When the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was repealed and replaced by the Bankruptcy Code as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, the six months rule, though not expressly mentioned, continued under section 1171 (b), in the Subchapter of Chapter 11 which
deals exclusively with railroad reorganizations.' 6 Section 1171 (b) provides that
[a]ny unsecured claim against the debtor that would have
been entitled to priority if a receiver in equity of the property of the debtor had been appointed by a Federal court on
the date of the order for relief under this title shall be entitled to the same priority in the case under this Chapter.17
Similar in concept to, but separate and distinct from, the six
months rule, the "necessity of payment doctrine" also developed in
nineteenth-century railroad receivership proceedings. Since first
enunciated in the 1882 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miltenberger v. Logansport Railway Co., the doctrine became an important part
of railroad reorganizations and receiverships.'1 Like the six months
rule, the necessity of payment doctrine permitted courts to allow receivers to pay certain pre-receivership unsecured creditors. Courts
12Currie & McCann, supra note 11, at 34.
13Id.
14 See id.

15Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 77B, 30 Stat. 544 (1899); Jeffrey N. Pomerantz, The
Bare Necessities of Critical Vendor Motions-It's a Jungle Out There, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 73,
76 (2004).
16 Seel 1 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (2000); Pomerantz, supra note 15, at 76.
17 See 1l U.S.C. § 1171(b).
18 See 106 U.S. 286, 310-12 (1882).
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limited the doctrine's use, however, to secure only the continued delivery of supplies and services essential to the debtor's continuation in
business.' 9 Also, unlike the six months rule, the "doctrine of necessity," as it became known later, is not a rule establishing priority of
claims; rather, it is a doctrine giving courts discretion to deviate from
the otherwise applicable rules of priority by making early payments to
certain creditors to achieve the greater goal of a successful reorganization. Whereas the six months rule directly changes the priority of
claims by paying ordinary course claims incurred within the six
months prior to a railroad reorganization before secured claims, the
doctrine of necessity permits payment of prebankruptcy unsecured
claims only when such payment is needed so that trade vendors or
other creditors will not refuse to supply critical goods and services
after the debtor files for bankruptcy protection.
When first developed, courts applied the doctrine of necessity,
like the six months rule, only in railroad reorganization cases for
which success was considered vital to the public interest.20 Consequently, giving preference to some creditors at the expense of others
was acceptable because the public depended on continued rail operations. In Dudley v. Mealey, a 1945 decision written by Learned Hand
and joined by Jerome Frank and Augustus Hand, involving the application of the six months rule, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit for the first time extended the six months rule to a nonrailroad reorganization case with the goal of encouraging successful
reorganization. 2 ' In particular, the court held that a hotel in a Chapter X case under the former Bankruptcy Act could provide for the
grant of priority of claims of prepetition vendors in its reorganization
plan.2 2 Gradually, other courts expanded the use of the doctrine of

necessity to cases that do not involve railroad reorganization, and
courts eventually utilized the doctrine to protect the interests of credi23
tors and reorganization efforts more generally.

19Goodman Oi4

713 F.2d at 537; In re Boston & Me., 634 F.2d at 1382.

20 Currie & McCann, supra note 11, at 34.

21See 147 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1945).
2 See id.
23 See In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 493 n.7, 497 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
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It. THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN CASES UNDER
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

Unlike the six months rule, the doctrine of necessity was not
codified when the Bankruptcy Code was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.24 As such, it could be argued that the absence of any mention of the doctrine demonstrates Congressional intent for its demise upon the Code's enactment. Thus, bankruptcy
courts should not have the authority to permit payment of prepetition
unsecured indebtedness, even if the continuing provision of goods and
services from certain creditors is critical to the debtor's reorganiza2
tion. 5
It also could be argued, however, that the Bankruptcy Code contains no indication that Congress intended to eliminate the doctrine
of necessity and to prohibit critical-vendor payments.2 6 Under prevailing statutory construction policies, the absence of any mention of the
doctrine does not necessarily mean that it did not survive the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. The Supreme Court has written that,
in the field of bankruptcy, when the Bankruptcy Code is silent regarding the survival of a judge-made rule that existed in cases under the
former Bankruptcy Act, the law as it existed before the Code's enactment should be assumed to continue to be applicable absent a strong
reason to the contrary: "[w]e will not read the Bankruptcy Code to
erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Con27
gress intended such a departure."
Most courts that have expanded the doctrine of necessity beyond
railroad reorganization cases have done so relying on the equitable
power provided in section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 28 Section
105(a), which sets forth the general equitable powers of bankruptcy

24 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (effective Oct.
1, 1979) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 etseq. (2000)).
25 SeeJoshua A. Ehrenfeld, Quieting the Rebellion: EliminatingPayment of Prepetition Debts
Priorto Chapter 11 Reorganizations,70 U. CHt. L. RE v. 621, 627 (2003); Eisenberg & Gecker,
supra note 11, at 3-4.
26 See Victor A. Vilaplana, Stretching the Code for Critical Vendors: Necessity Is the Mother of
Invention, in 2, 26TH ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION,

491, 528 (2004).

27Pa. Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47 (1986)).
28 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); see In rejust for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 824 (D. Del. 1999) (explaining that even if the doctrine of necessity is not codified in the Code, courts have
authorized pre-petition claims when necessary using their equitable powers under

§ 105(a)).
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courts, provides in relevant part: "[t]he court may issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]."29
Section 1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code grants a debtor in possession the rights, powers, and duties of a trustee serving in a case
under Chapter 11, including the right to operate the debtor's business, authorized by section 1108.30 The argument that follows, therefore, is that section 105(a) gives courts the authority to enable a
debtor in possession to fulfill its duty to do what is reasonably necessary to keep its existing business operating. Included in this duty is
paying prepetition claims when necessary to assure that creditors
whose continuing delivery of goods and services are critical to the reorganization effort do not stop dealing with the debtor due to nonpayment of prepetition indebtedness.
The brevity of section 105(a) and its legislative history, however,
do not provide much insight to the limits of the courts' equitable
powers authorized by this section. 31 Section 105(a) and its legislative
history are silent about critical-vendor payments and the ability of the
courts to circumvent the priority scheme under section 507 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 32 Courts condemning the use of section 105(a) to
allow critical-vendor payments point out that the Supreme Court has
noted that "whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy
courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the
Bankruptcy Code."3 3 The Bankruptcy Code specifically sets out certain types of claims that are entitled to an administrative expense priority.34 As one bankruptcy court has noted, "a prepetition unsecured
claim cannot be elevated to an administrative expense since the
scheme of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code does not allow [a] Court to
35
change the classification of claims set by Congress in the Code."
§ 105(a).
Id. §§ 1107(a), 1108.
s1See id. § 105(a); S. REP. No. 95-989, at 29 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5815; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 316 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6273-74;
140 CONG. REc. H10,764 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994).
32 Joseph Gilday, "Critical"Error: Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate the Bankruptcy Code,
11 Am.BANKR. INST. L. REv. 411, 431-32 (2003); see 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000); S. REP. No.
95-989, at 29 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5815; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 316
(1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6273-74; 140 CONG. REc. H10,764 (daily ed. Oct.
4, 1994).
s3Norwest Bank Worthington v.Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988).
- See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507(a), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
35 In re Timberhouse Post & Beam, Ltd., 196 B.R. 547, 550-51 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1996);
see also United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 541 (1996).
29 11 U.S.C.
30
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Notwithstanding the uncertainty about the doctrine of necessity's
existence under the Code, bankruptcy courts have often relied on the
doctrine and section 105(a) to authorize the payment of prepetition
claims.3 6 In many cases, the doctrine has been used, without objection, to justify the payment of prepetition unsecured claims that are
entitled to priority under section 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 37 In
fact, probably the most common use of the doctrine of necessity is for
the payment of prepetition wages. 38 For example, if a debtor ordinar-

ily pays its employees their weekly wages on Friday afternoons and
files a Chapter 11 petition on Wednesday after the close of business,
the debtor would not have the right to pay its employees their earned
wages for the week, except for the wages earned postpetition (Thursday and Friday), until a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed. 39 The debtor
could pay wages earned postpetition because those wages constitute
administrative expenses, which may be paid in the ordinary course
of business. 41 The delay in the payment of wages earned prepetition,
however, could cause substantial hardship to employees and could
damage employee morale. It is important to note that the unpaid
wage claims for the prepetition part of that week ordinarily would be
entitled to priority under section 507(a) so that such employees
would most likely be paid in full after a plan is confirmed, subject to
the statutory cap on the wage-claim priority.42 To avoid undue hard36 In re Bob's Stores, Inc., No. 03-13254 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct. 22, 2003); In re Discovery Zone, Inc., No. 99-00941 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Apr. 20, 1999); In re Acme Steel Co.
et al., No. 98-02180 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Sept. 28,1998).
37 In re Bob's Stores, Inc., No. 03-13254 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct. 22, 2003); see Donald
S. Bernstein & Nancy L. Sanborn, The Going Concern in Chapter11, in CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS
REORGANIZATIONS 1993, at 157, 212-15.
38 In re Bradlees Stores, Inc., No. 00-16035 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y filed Dec. 26, 2000).
39Id.
"o See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 329, 119 Stat. 23, 101 (to be codified at, and
amending, 11 U.S.C. § 503 (b) (1) (A)).
41 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (2000); In re New Almanacs, Inc., 196 B.R. 244 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y 1996) (citing In reTelesphere Commc'ns, Inc., 148 B.R. 525, 530-31 (Bankr. N.D.
Il1. 1992)).
42 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4), amended by BAPCPA §§ 212(2),(5), 1401, 119 Stat. at 5152, 214. Before the 2005 amendments, the wage priority was in section 507(a)(3). 11
U.S.C. § 507(a) (3) (2000). The statutory limit on employee wage claims was $4925 per
employee in cases commenced on or before April 20, 2005. Id. (according to § 104(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code, on April 1, 2004, the dollar amount increased from $4650 to $4925
based on the Consumer Price Index). The dollar limit was increased to $10,000 per employee for cases commenced on or after April 20, 2005. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (4), amended by
BAPCPA §§ 212(2),(5), 1401, 119 Stat. at 51-52, 214. This dollar amount will be adjusted
every three years under 11 U.S.C. 104(b). 11 U.S.C. § 104(b), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23.
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ship on employees that could result in poor employee morale, many
courts have granted motions filed by debtors in possession, usually on
the first day of the case, permitting the payment of prepetition wages
in the ordinary course of business to the extent that such wage claims
would have priority under section 507(a). 43
Similarly, the doctrine of necessity has been used, almost routinely in large Chapter 11 cases, to authorize a debtor in possession to
honor customer claims, such as warranty claims,4 and other customer
obligations, such as discount programs, 45 the right to return goods, 46
lay-away plans, 47 and frequent flier programs. 48 The honoring of these
obligations is necessary to continue the debtor's good will with its customers and to instill customer confidence in the debtor's business.
III.

THE LIMITS (OR SLOW DEATH) OF SECTION

105(A)

Bankruptcy courts and district courts have often relied on section
105(a) to authorize critical-vendor payments in Chapter 11 cases.
When challenged, they often found that the doctrine of necessity gave
them the discretion to permit payments to critical vendors. For example, in In reJust for Feet, Inc., the District Court for the District of Delaware, relying on the doctrine of necessity and section 105(a) as
authority, held that the debtor, an athletic footwear and apparel retailer, could pay prepetition claims of certain critical vendors. 49 The
debtor persuaded the court that the debtor's reorganization efforts
would be seriously harmed if the debtor could not get the necessary
43 See, e.g., In reCEI Roofing, Inc., 315 B.R. 50, 53, 61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004). See generaly, In re EqualNet Commc'ns Corp., 258 B.R. 368, 370 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000) (discussing the doctrine of necessity, and noting that employee wage claims are priority claims in
whole or in part, the court wrote that "[t]he need to pay these claims in an ordinary
course of business time frame is simple common sense. Employees are more likely to stay
in place and to refrain from actions which could be detrimental to the case and/or the
estate if their pay and benefits remain intact and uninterrupted").
4In
re Allis-Chalmers Corp., No. 87-11226 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y filed June 29, 1987).
45 In re ANC Rental Corp., No. 01-11200 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 5, 2001); Debtor's Motion Pursuant to § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and the Doctrine of Necessity for an
Order Authorizing but not Directing Debtors in Possession to Honor Prepetition Obligations Relating to Certain (i) Vendors that Support Marketing and Sales Programs (ii) Customer Incentive Programs (iii) Critical Contract Labor and (iv) Employee Related Corporate Credit Card Programs, In re ANC Rental Corp., No. 01-11200 (Bankr. D. Del. filed
Nov. 13, 2001).
46
In re Bob's Stores, Inc., No. 03-13254 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct. 22, 2003).
47 In reZB Co. Inc., No. 03-13672 (JBR) (Bankr. D. Del. filed Dec. 4, 2003).
48
In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 05-17923 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y filed Sept. 14, 2005).
49 242 B.R. 821, 824-26 (D. Del. 1999).
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goods from its trade vendors in time for the holiday season. 50 The
court commented that the doctrine of necessity remained viable in
the Third Circuit, although most of the cases cited by the court in
support of the doctrine involved railroad reorganizations. 51 The court
asserted that, despite the automatic stay under section 362 of the
Code, "[c]ertain pre-petition claims by employees and trade creditors,
however, may need to be paid to facilitate a successful reorganization." The court further noted that section 105(a) "provides a statu52
tory basis for the payment of pre-petition claims."
Although bankruptcy courts and district courts were using the
doctrine of necessity and section 105(a) to permit critical-vendor
payments, appellate courts in several circuits have been less willing to
permit payment of prepetition debt to vendors or to recognize section
105(a) as authority for such payments. 53 Probably the most dramatic
and sympathetic set of facts in any case involving payment of prepetition claims under the authority of section 105(a) was Official Committee
of Equity Security Holders v. Mabey.54 That decision involved thousands of
personal-injury claims held by women who were injured by the Dalkon Shield contraceptive device sold by A.H. Robins Co., the Chapter
11 debtor. 55 The examiner in that case sought court authorization to
place $15 million in an emergency treatment fund to provide surgery
or in-vitro fertilization to certain victims who were likely to benefit
from such medical treatment in connection with their claimed infertility.56 The funds would be paid directly to the doctor and hospital
providing medical assistance to the injured victims. 57 The cost of the
surgery would be between $10,000 and $15,000 per claimant.58 Under
a proposed plan of reorganization, Dalkon Shield claimants would be
compensated out of a $1.75 billion fund and all other creditors would
be paid in full.5 9 Also, the distribution to each Dalkon Shield claimant
would be reduced by the amount spent on the surgery, so that the
50 Id. at

826.

51Id. at 824-25 (citing In re Lehigh & New Eng. Ry. Co., 657 F.2d 570, 581 (3d Cir.

1981), In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d 100, 102 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972), In reColumbia
Gas Sys., Inc., 171 B.R. 189, 191-92 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994)).
52
Id.at 824.
53 See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871, 874 (7th Cir. 2004); Chiasson v. J.
Louis Matherne & Assocs. (In reOxford Mgmt., Inc.), 4 F.3d 1329, 1334 (5th Cir. 1993).
54832 F.2d 299, 299-301 (4th Cir. 1987).
55 See id. at 300.
56 See id.
57 Id.
58

Id.at 301.
59Mabey, 832 F.2d at 301.
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amount paid from the $15 million emergency treatment fund would
actually be a loan against subsequent distributions. 60
The district court approved the establishment of the emergency
treatment fund, subsequently indicating that its authority for the unusual order was section 105(a) of the Code. 61 The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, however, reversed, stating:
[w]hile the equitable powers emanating from § 105(a) are
quite important in the general bankruptcy scheme, and while
such powers may encourage courts to be innovative, and even
original, these equitable powers are not a license for a court
to disregard the clear language and meaning of the bank-

62
ruptcy statutes and rules.

The court continued:
While one may understand and sympathize with the district court's concern for the Dalkon Shield claimants, who
may desire reconstructive surgery or in-vitro fertilization, the
creation of the Emergency Treatment Fund at this stage in
the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings violates the clear
language and intent of the Bankruptcy Code, and such action may not be justified as an exercise of the court's equitable powers under § 105(a). The Bankruptcy Code does not
permit a distribution to unsecured creditors in a Chapter 11
proceeding except under and pursuant to a plan of reorganization that has been properly presented and approved. 63
Appellate courts in other circuits have also limited the application of the court's equitable powers in connection with the payment
of prepetition claims. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the notion that a bankruptcy court's equitable powers
support the payment of critical vendors' prebankruptcy claims. In
B&W Enterprises, Inc. v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B&W Enterprises, Inc.),
the court wrote that it is "unwise to tamper with the statutory priority
scheme devised by Congress." 64 After the debtor, a trucking company,
60 See id. at 300.

61 See id. at 301 (referring to the lower court's order approving the establishment of
the emergency fund).
62 Id. at 302.

63

Id.

64 713 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1983).
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paid prepetition claims of certain trade creditors without obtaining
court approval, the Chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid such payments
under sections 549 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. 65 The bankruptcy court held that the transfer can be avoided and the district
court and Ninth Circuit affirmed. 66 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
"[t] here is no indication that Congress intended the courts to fashion
their own rules of super-priorities within any given priority class" and
that the court's equitable powers cannot be used to justify such pre67
petition claims payments.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Chiasson v. J.Louis
Matherne & Associates (In re Oxford Management, Inc.), held that claims
for real estate brokerage commissions, incurred before the commencement of the bankruptcy case, could not be paid to the agents to
which they were owed because such payments would violate the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. 68 The court said that "[s]ection
105(a) authorizes a bankruptcy court to fashion such orders as are
necessary to further the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code" but could not be used to allow postpetition payments on prepetition claims of general unsecured creditors because making such
payments "deviated from the pro rata scheme of distribution envisioned by the Code." 69
After the Fifth Circuit's decision in Chiasson, the Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Texas, in In re CoServ, L.L.C., announced that it would approve a debtor's request for payment of prepetition claims only in very limited circumstances. 70 The court noted
that the Fifth Circuit held that section 105(a)'s equitable powers do
not extend to a payment of prepetition claims in all situations. 71 The
court reasoned that payments of the prepetition claims disrupt the
priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, courts should
carefully evaluate allowance of such requests. 72 The court commented
that a creditor's demand for payment of prepetition claims, particularly where the creditor has a contract with the debtor, constitutes
"economic blackmail" and may violate the automatic stay imposed by

65Id. at 535-36; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 549, 550.
66Goodman Oi4 713 F.2d at 535-36, 538.
67 Id. at

537.

6 4 F.3d at 1334.
69Id. at 1333-34.
70 See 273 B.R. 487, 498 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
71See id. at 495.
72 See

id. at 494.
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section 362(a).73 The court then adopted a three-part test for deciding whether prepetition claims should be paid. 74 First, the court must
determine whether the payment is indispensable to the debtor's business, such as when the creditor is a sole supplier of a given product or
a creditor with control over valuable property.75 Second, the court
must determine whether nonpayment of the claim risks probable
harm or eliminates an economic advantage disproportionate to the
amount of the actual claim. 76 Third, the court must decide whether
there is any practical or legal alternative to payment of the claim, such
as providing a deposit or assuming an executory contract between the
77
.debtor and the creditor.
A subsequent bankruptcy case in Texas, In re Mirant Corp., followed In re CoServ and applied the same three-part test. 78 The debtor

in that case generated and sold electric power and a trade creditor's
refusal to supply necessary goods and services would have seriously
impaired not only the debtor's reorganization, but also the nation's
economy.79 Recognizing these circumstances, the bankruptcy court
gave the debtor the authority to evaluate the propriety of potential
critical-vendor payments on an on-going basis under the In re CoServ
three-part test.80
IV. THE

KMART DECISION

The most recent, as well as notorious, decisions dealing with
critical-vendor payments were rendered in In re Kmart Corp. and Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corp.81 On January 22, 2002, Kmart Corporation and certain of its domestic subsidiaries and affiliates filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition for reorganization. 82 In one of the
motions filed on the first day of the case, Kmart sought authority to
pay certain prepetition obligations to critical vendors and certain for-

73 Id. (citing In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86 B.R. 922, 932 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1988)).
74 Id. at 498.

75 In re CoServ, 273 B.R. at 498.
76

Id.
77 Id. at 498-99.

- 296 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003).
79 See id. at 428.
8 Id. at 429-30.
81In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004); Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corp.,
291 B.R. 818 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
82 Kmart, 291 B.R. at 820.
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eign vendors.83 On the same day, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois issued an order granting Kmart "openended permission to pay any debt to any vendor [Kmart] deemed
'critical' in the exercise of unilateral discretion, provided that the
vendor agreed to furnish goods on 'customary trade terms' for the
next two years."8 4 The bankruptcy court relied on section 105 and,
implicitly, on the doctrine of necessity in authorizing the criticalvendor payments.85 In total, Kmart was authorized to pay, at its discretion, in excess of $320 million in prepetition claims to numerous
critical vendors, both foreign and domestic, including liquor distributors and advertising companies.86 Kmart did not include Capital Factors, a factoring company with an unsecured claim of approximately
$20 million, as a critical vendor. As a result, Capital Factors objected
to Kmart's first-day motion. 87 The objection was unsuccessful in the
bankruptcy court.88 Capital Factors appealed the critical-vendor payment order to the district court, but failed to obtain a stay of the
bankruptcy court's first-day orders pending appeal.89 Kmart proceeded to pay out more than $300 million to 2330 "critical" suppliers
in payment of their prepetition claims. 90 Approximately 2000 vendors
were not deemed "critical" and therefore were not paid, and, eventually, they received a distribution under a plan of reorganization that
was worth approximately ten percent of their claims. 91
On appeal, the district court reversed and remanded the matter
back to the bankruptcy court to order the return of all payments
made to vendors with respect to prepetition claims. 92 As to the doctrine of necessity, the court asserted that the doctrine derived from
railroad reorganization cases and was not codified in the Bankruptcy
83Id.
84 In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 868-69. Over the next two weeks Kmart filed two more motions seeking authority to pay issuers of prepetition letters of credit and prepetition claims
of certain liquor vendors. Kmart, 291 B.R. at 820. Both of these motions were approved by
the court and became subject to Capital Factors' later appeal. Id. at 820-21.
S See Kmart, 291 B.R. at 821-23.
8 Thomas J. Salerno, "The Mouse That Roared" or "Hell Hath No Fury Like a Oitical Vendor
Scorned, "Am. BANKR. INST.J.,June 2003, http://www.abiworld.org/Content/NavigationMenu/
Publications/OnlineABIjournal/Archivel/ABIjournalArchives.htm (click on "2003," then
June," then follow "LAST IN LINE: 'The Mouse That Roared': Or, 'Hell Hath No Fury Like a
Critical Vendor Scorned'" hyperlink).
87 Kmart, 291 B.R. at 820.
85
Id.
89 Id. at 821,823.
90 In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 869.
91 Id.
92 Kmart, 291

B.R. at 825.
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Code. 93 The only way to apply the doctrine of necessity, wrote the
court, was through section 105. 94 The district court noted, however,

that courts were split on allowing critical-vendor payments based on
the doctrine of necessity and on the section 105(a) equitable powers
of the bankruptcy courts.

95

The district court noted that the Seventh

Circuit stated that "the grant of equitable power in § 105 is limited in
that it 'allows [bankruptcy] courts to use their equitable powers only
as necessary to enforce the provisions of the Code, not to add on to
the Code as they see fit.'

96

The district court cited the Seventh Circuit's admonition that
"It] he fact that a [bankruptcy] proceeding is equitable does not give
the judge a free-floating discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his personal views of justice and fairness, however enlightened those views may be." 97 It also determined that the bankruptcy

court's order elevated the claims of the critical vendors over those of
other unsecured creditors and subordinated the claims of non-critical
unsecured creditors. 98 The district court concluded that the bankruptcy court had impermissibly altered the priority scheme set forth
in the Bankruptcy Code without articulating any applicable authority
to support doing so and, therefore, its critical-vendor order could not
be allowed to stand. 99
In 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision.1 00 Judge Easterbrook, writing for the
court, wrote that section 105(a) does not give bankruptcy courts discretion to permit the debtor to pay prebankruptcy unsecured claims
in violation of the Bankruptcy Code's rules on priority.101
The Seventh Circuit also noted that section 105(a) allows bankruptcy courts to issue orders or judgments that are necessary to carry
out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, but "does not create discretion to set aside the Code's rules about priority and distribu-

93 Id. at 822.
94

Id.
95Id.
96 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In reFesco Plastics Corp. Inc., 996 F.2d 152, 156
(7th Cir. 1993)).
97 Kmart, 291 B.R. at 823 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986)).
o8Id. at 822.
99See id. at 822-23.
100 In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 874.
101See id. at 871.
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tion."102 The court further pointed out that "the power conferred by §
105(a) is one to implement rather than override." 103 The equitable
nature of the bankruptcy proceedings does not permit the judges to
redistribute rights in accordance with their personal views of fairness.10 4 "Every circuit that has considered the question has held that
this statute does not allow a bankruptcy judge to authorize full payment of any unsecured debt, unless all unsecured creditors in the
class are paid in full."105 Judge Easterbrook then announced the Seventh Circuit's agreement with that view.10 6
Judge Easterbrook's opinion went on to say that "doctrine of ne10 7
cessity is just a fancy name for a power to depart from the Code."
The court stated that the Bankruptcy Code replaced the common-law
bankruptcy principles worked out in the railroad reorganization
cases.10 8 Older doctrines, such as the doctrine of necessity, may still
survive only as aids to interpretation of ambiguous language of the
Bankruptcy Code, but not as "freestanding entitlements to trump the
text."109
The court then considered whether any other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code could be used to authorize the grant of criticalvendor payments."10 The court rejected the notion that section 364(b)
could provide a basis for permitting payment of prepetition debt to
critical vendors.' Judge Easterbrook noted that section 364 authorizes the debtor to obtain credit but does not say anything about how
112
the money will be distributed or about priorities among creditors.
The court specifically rejected the holding in In re Payless Cashways,
Inc., where critical-vendor payments were allowed pursuant to section
364. 13 The Seventh Circuit in In re Kmart likewise held that section
503 could not be used to justify critical-vendor payments." 4 The court
reasoned that "[p]re-filing debts are not administrative expenses; they
102Id.

103 Id.
104Id. (citing In re Chicago, Milwaukee, 791 F.2d at 528).

105
In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 871.
106 Id.
107 Id.

108Id.
109Id.
110In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 872.
111Id.; see I1 U.S.C. § 364(b) (2000).
112

In reKmart, 359 F.3d at 872; see 11 U.S.C. § 364.

113In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 872; In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543, 544 (Bankr.

W.D. Mo. 2001); see 11 U.S.C. § 364.
114 359 F.3d at 872; see 11 U.S.C. § 503.
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debts as 'administrative' claims against the post-filing entity would
impair the ability of bankruptcy law to prevent old debts from sinking
a viable firm."115
In dicta, Judge Easterbrook left the door open to possible use of
section 363(b) to authorize critical-vendor payments in future cases. 116
That section provides that "[t]he trustee, after notice and a hearing,
may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business,
property of the estate." 117 It could be argued that section 363(b) may
be used to authorize the debtor, in exercising its business judgment,
to use estate funds to make payments of prepetition claims to certain
creditors." 8 Judge Easterbrook wrote that section 363(b) "is more
promising, for satisfaction of a prepetition debt in order to keep
'critical' supplies flowing is a use of property other than in the ordinary course of administering an estate in bankruptcy."" 9 The Seventh
Circuit also cautioned against using section 363(b) authority to disrupt the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code, stressing that although section 363(b) may allow certain changes in the priority of
creditors, such changes should be kept to a minimum: "it is prudent
to read, and use, § 363(b) (1) to do the least damage possible to priorities established by contract and by other parts of the Bankruptcy
Code." 12 0 The court then refused to rule on whether section
363(b) (1) may be used to justify payment of prepetition unsecured
debt to maintain the flow of goods from "critical vendors," because
"this order was unsound no matter how one reads § 363 (b) (1)."121
The Seventh Circuit then placed strict procedural and evidentiary limits on the use of § 363(b) (1) to pay prepetition unsecured
debts, without deciding whether that section of the Code may ever
justify such payments:
llI In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 872.
116See id.
17 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2000). Section 363(b)(1) was amended in 2005, but the
amendments did not change the quoted language. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 231 (a),
119 Stat. 23, 72-73 (to be codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1)).
11s See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 175 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y 1989) ("Section 363(b) gives the court broad flexibility in tailoring its orders to
meet a wide variety of circumstances."); cf In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 493 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2002) (rejecting the notion that section 363 can be used to authorize criticalvendor payments).
19 In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 872.
120 Id.
121Id.
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The foundation of a critical-vendors order is the belief that
vendors not paid for prior deliveries will refuse to make new
ones. Without merchandise to sell, a retailer such as Kmart
will fold.... [11 t is necessary to show not only that the disfavored creditors will be as well off with reorganization as with
liquidation-a demonstration never attempted in this proceeding-but also that the supposedly critical vendors would
have ceased deliveries if old debts were left unpaid while the
litigation continued. If vendors will deliver against a promise
of current payment, then a reorganization can be achieved,
and all unsecured creditors will obtain its benefit, without
122
preferring any of the unsecured creditors.
The court also noted that some critical vendors would continue
to do business with the debtor postpetition because they are legally
obligated to perform long-term contracts and the automatic stay under section 362(a) prevents these vendors from refusing to make
postpetition deliveries so long as the debtor pays for new goods. 123
One vendor, Fleming Companies, which received the largest payment
for prepetition debt among Kmart's alleged critical vendors because it
sold Kmart between $70 million and $100 million of groceries and
related goods weekly, was one of those obligated to continue to make
deliveries under a long-term contract: "[n]o matter how much Fleming would have liked to dump Kmart, it had no right to do so. It was
unnecessary to compensate Fleming for continuing to make deliveries
that it was legally required to make."124
The court also explained why it would be very difficult for a
debtor in possession, when attempting to justify the use of section
363(b) (1) to authorize payment of prepetition debt, to prove that a
particular vendor would, in fact, refuse to make future deliveries, even
if not obligated to do so under a prepetition contract. 125
Each new delivery produced a profit; as long as Kmart continued to pay for new product, why would any vendor drop
the account? That would be a self-inflicted wound. To abjure
new profits because of old debts would be to commit the
sunk-cost fallacy; well-managed businesses are unlikely to do
this. Firms that disdain current profits because of old losses
122Id. at
123 Id. at

872-73.

873; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000).
re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 873.
125See id.
124In
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are unlikely to stay in business. They might as well burn
money or drop it into the ocean. 126
The Seventh Circuit also addressed the concern that vendors
might refuse to deliver goods postpetition out of fear that they would
not get paid for those deliveries. 127 By suggesting ways to address those
concerns, the court apparently heightened the debtor's burden of
proof in obtaining an order authorizing the payment of prepetition
28
debt owed to critical vendors.
Doubtless many suppliers fear the prospect of throwing good
money after bad. It therefore may be vital to assure them
that a debtor will pay for new deliveries on a current basis.
Providing that assurance need not, however, entail payment
for prepetition transactions. Kmart could have paid cash or
its equivalent. (Kmart's CEO told the bankruptcy judge that
COD arrangements were not part of Kmart's business plan,
as if a litigant's druthers could override the rights of third
parties.) Cash on the barrelhead was not the most convenient way, however. Kmart secured a $2 billion line of credit
when it entered bankruptcy. Some of that credit could have
been used to assure vendors that payment would be forthcoming for all post-petition transactions. The easiest way to
do that would have been to put some of the $2 billion behind a standby letter of credit on which the bankruptcy
judge could authorize unpaid vendors to draw. That would
not have changed the terms on which Kmart and any of its
vendors did business; it just would have demonstrated the
certainty of payment. If lenders are unwilling to issue such a
letter of credit (or if they insist on a letter's short duration),
that would be a compelling market signal that reorganization is a poor prospect and that the debtor should be liquidated post haste.
Yet the bankruptcy court did not explore the possibility of
using a letter of credit to assure vendors of payment. The
court did not find that any firm would have ceased doing
business with Kmart if not paid for pre-petition deliveries,
and the scant record would not have supported such a
26

1

127

Id.
See id.

128 See id.
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finding had one been made. The court did not find that discrimination among unsecured creditors was the only way to
facilitate a reorganization. It did not find that the disfavored
creditors were at least as well off as they would have been
had the critical-vendors order not been entered.... Even if

§ 362(b) (1) [sic] allows critical-vendors orders in principle,
preferential payments to a class of creditors are proper only
if the record shows the prospect of benefit to the other
creditors. This record does not, so the critical-vendors order
cannot stand. 12
The Seventh Circuit in In re Kmart, by rejecting section 105(a) and
the doctrine of necessity as a basis for authorizing payment of prebankruptcy claims of unsecured vendors, and by re-focusing the criticalvendor debate on section 363(b), which it interpreted as having a high
burden of proof, has clearly and substantially raised the bar for debtors
seeking to pay critical-vendor claims early in a Chapter 11 case.13 0 The
decision also exemplifies the trend in the appellate courts of limiting
bankruptcy courts' previously broad discretion to authorize a debtor to
pay prepetition claims outside of a plan of reorganization.' 3 1
V.

THE IMPACT OF THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005 ON THE DOCTRINE
OF NECESSITY AND CRITICAL-VENDOR PAYMENTS

A. AdministrativePriorityfor Goods Delivered Within Twenty
Days Before Bankruptcy
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005 has amended the Bankruptcy Code in two significant ways
that are likely to impact critical-vendor payments. First, the 2005 Act
129 In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 873-74.
1" See id. at 871-73. That does not mean, however, that courts following In re Kmart

have not authorized payment to critical vendors. In In re Tropical Sportswear Int'l Corp.,
320 B.R. 15, 18, 20-21 (M.D. Fla. 2005), the bankruptcy court allowed the debtors, a designer and marketer of clothing, to use estate funds to pay 77.5% of prepetition amounts
owed to certain critical vendors. The court relied on sections 105 and 363(b)(1), and the
court's opinion heavily referenced In re Kmart and the evidentiary test proposed by In re
Kmart in determining whether the critical payments should be allowed. Id. at 19-20; see 11
U.S.C. §§ 105, 363(b)(1) (2000).
131Notwithstanding, courts have distinguished In re Kmart in cases involving the payment of prepetition priority wage claims, because there are fewer concerns about affecting
the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code or unfairly favoring some unsecured creditors
over others. See In reCEI Roofing, Inc., 315 B.R. 50, 53-54 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004).
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added section 503(b) (9) to the Code to give administrative expense
treatment for "the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20
days before the date of commencement of a case under [the Bankruptcy Code] in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the
ordinary course of such debtor's business."'132 The result is that such
claims have administrative priority under section 507(a) (2) of the
Code. 133 Apparently, the rationale for granting priority to such vendors is that within twenty days before bankruptcy, a debtor is likely to
know that bankruptcy is imminent and that it will not be able to pay
for goods delivered within that time period. Moreover, goods delivered so close to the bankruptcy filing are likely to benefit the bankruptcy estate. This new provision is a radical departure from the general rule that only postpetition expenses are afforded administrative
priority. Curiously, section 503 (b) (9) gives providers of goods priority
over similarly situated providers of services or lenders who gave the
debtor value within the twenty-day period.
This new provision is similar in concept to the six months rule
used in railroad reorganization cases in at least two ways. First, it is a
rule of priority, rather than payment. That is, by giving such claims
administrative expense status, the amendment clearly gives such vendors priority over general unsecured creditors and above most other
priority claims. Indeed, such vendor claims will have priority over
wage and tax claims. 34 In involuntary bankruptcy cases, section
503 (b) (9) vendor claims will have priority over claims of unsecured
creditors who extend credit in the ordinary course of business during
the gap period between the filing of the petition and the earlier of the
appointment of a trustee or order for relief. 135 The Code does not,
132 BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1227, 119 Stat. 23, 199-200 (to be codified at 11
U.S.C. § 503(b) (9)). This section is effective in cases that are commenced on or after October 17, 2005. See id. § 1501, 119 Stat. at 216 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 note)
(providing effective date of amendments).
133 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2) (2000), amended by BAPCPA §§ 212(2),(3), 1401, 119 Stat. at
51-52, 214. In cases commenced before October 17, 2005, administrative expenses were
afforded a first priority under section 507(a)(1). 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1). In cases commenced on or after that date, domestic support obligations are afforded the first priority
under section 507(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1), amended by BAPCPA §§ 212(2),(9), 1404,
119 Stat. at 51-52, 214, and administrative expenses are afforded a second priority under
section 507(a) (2). Id. § 507(a) (2), amended by BAPCPA §§ 212(2),(3), 1404, 119 Stat. at 5152, 214.
134 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a), amended by BAPCPA § 212, 119 Stat. at 51, for the ranking
among priority claims.
131 BAPCPA § 1227(b), 119 Stat. at 199-200 (to be codified at, and amending, 11
U.S.C. § 503(b)). With respect to priority of claims allowed under section 502(f) of the
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however, specify when payment will be made. It remains to be seen
whether courts in Chapter 11 cases will allow payment of these vendor
claims before confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Under section
503(a) of the Code, any entity with an administrative claim may file a
request for payment, and it is within the court's discretion whether to
authorize payment during the case.1 36 In a Chapter 11 case, administrative expenses must be paid in full on the effective date of the plan
unless paid earlier, either in the ordinary course of business or with
court authorization. 137 Arguably, prepetition vendor claims are never
payable in the ordinary course of business because of the intervening
bankruptcy and the automatic stay, even if afforded administrative
expense priority. If courts adopt that view, actual payment of section
503(b) (9) vendor claims will require either a court order authorizing
payment or a confirmed Chapter 11 plan.
Section 503(b) (9) is also similar to the six months rule in that
priority status is granted automatically.138 The debtor does not have to
demonstrate that the creditor is "critical" or that payment of the claim
is necessary for a successful reorganization. In fact, the new section
applies in all types of bankruptcy cases-including Chapter 7 liquidation cases-indicating that Congress did not intend to link payment
of these prepetition vendor claims to the necessity for effective reorganization.
It is worth noting that section 503(b) (9) refers to the "value" of
the goods received by the debtor within the twenty-day period before
bankruptcy. 139 It does not refer to "purchase price" or "claim" arising
from the sale. 4° It can be expected that value will be the same as the
purchase price in most cases, especially if any arguable difference in
the two amounts is not so material as to warrant litigation over that
issue. Nevertheless, the language of the section leaves open the argument that value, in a particular case, may be an amount that is either
higher or lower than the purchase price. 141

Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 502(f); BAPCPA § 212(2), (4), 119 Stat. at 51-52; Id.
§ 1401, 119 Stat. at 214 (to be codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (3)).
136 See ll U.S.C. § 503(a); ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 6:27 at 519-20
n.1 (5th ed. 2002).
137Seell U.S.C. § 363(c) (1); BAPCPA § 1502(a) (8), 119 Stat. at 216-17 (to be codified
at, and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (9)).
1- SeeBAPCPA § 1227, 119 Stat. at 199-200 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (9)).
139See id.
140See id.
141 See id.
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The need to rely on the doctrine of necessity to pay critical vendors will be reduced in future cases because of section 503(b) (9).142
Critical vendors, as well as non-critical vendors, with claims for goods
delivered within twenty days before bankruptcy should be willing to
continue to do business with the debtor in possession in a Chapter 11
case, unless there is a concern that the debtor may not have sufficient
assets from which to pay administrative expense claims in full. That
concern could be alleviated by appropriate provisions in postpetition
financing arrangements that will assure sufficient funds to pay administrative expenses.
Alternatively, a request may be made under section 503(a) for
immediate payment for goods delivered within the twenty-day prebankruptcy period. 143 Determining when an administrative expense is
to be paid is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court.144 As discussed above, courts have been more willing to permit immediate
payment of prepetition claims, such as wage claims, when such claims
are entitled to priority in treatment and, therefore, are likely to be
paid in full later in the case. It could be anticipated that a critical
vendor that insists on immediate payment of its section 503(b)(9)
claim as a condition to doing business with the debtor in possession
will have its claim treated in a manner similar to the treatment of priority wage claims; courts will likely grant the debtor's request under
section 503(a) to make such payment. Clearly, the burden of proof to
pay an administrative priority claim will be easier to satisfy than the
burden required to pay a nonpriority unsecured claim under section
105(a), section 363(b), or the doctrine of necessity.
B. Expansion of Reclamation Rights of Vendors
The 2005 Act also amended section 546(c) of the Code, which
deals with a seller's right to reclaim goods sold to the debtor in the
ordinary course of the seller's business. 145 The Act could also reduce
the demand for court authorization to pay critical vendors.
In cases commenced before the effective date of the 2005
amendments, section 546(c) provides that the avoiding powers of a
trustee or debtor in possession are subject to any statutory or com142 See

id.

U.S.C. § 503(a) (2000).
In reVerco Indus., 20 B.R. 664, 665 (B.A.P 9th Cir. 1982).
145 BAPCPA § 1227(a), 119 Stat. at 199-200 (to be codified at, and amending, 11
U.S.C. § 546(c)).
143 See 11
14
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mon-law right of a seller that has sold goods to the debtor, in the ordinary course of the seller's business, to reclaim those goods if the
debtor has received the goods while insolvent1 46 Nevertheless, strict
time limits apply in such cases. 147 To exercise this right in cases commenced before the effective date of the 2005 amendments, the seller
must demand reclamation in writing before ten days after the debtor
received the goods or, if the ten-day period expired after commencement of the bankruptcy case, before twenty days after receipt of the
goods. '4 If a timely demand is made, the seller must comply with state
law regarding reclamation, which is section 2-702 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.1 49 Under state law, the right of reclamation is subject to the rights of a purchaser in the ordinary course or other goodfaith purchaser of the goods. 150 In addition, for the right of reclamation to apply, the debtor must have possession of the goods when the
demand was made,1 5' and the goods must be identifiable. 52 If a timely
reclamation demand is made, the court has discretion to compel the
return of the goods to the seller, or it may deny reclamation and grant
the seller's claim administrative priority, or secure the claim with a
53
lien on property
The 2005 amendments have expanded a seller's right to reclaim
goods. First, rather than requiring the seller to demand reclamation
within ten days after receipt of the goods (or twenty days if the ten-day
period expires after commencement of the bankruptcy case), section
546(c), as amended, gives the seller reclamation rights if the debtor
14611 U.S.C. § 546(c); see also BAPCPA § 406(1),(2), 119 Stat. at 105-06 (to be codified
at, and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 546(h)) (designated as 11 U.S.C. § 5 4 6 (g) before the 2005
amendments). Section 546(c), first added to the Code in 1994, authorizes the court, on
motion made within 120 days after the order for relief in a Chapter 11 case, to permit a
trustee or debtor in possession, with the seller's consent, to return goods shipped to the
debtor before the commencement of the case, and the seller may offset the purchase price
against any prepetition claim of the seller. 11 U.S.C. § 5 4 6(g) (2000). The court, however,
must find that the return of the goods is in the best interest of the estate. Id.
147See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c).
8
14 Id. § 546(c) (1).
149
SeeU.C.C. § 2-702(3) (2003).
150Id.
151 See, e.g., In re Adventist Living Ctrs., Inc., 52 F.3d 159, 162 (7th Cir. 1995); Flav-O-

Rich, Inc., v. Rawson Food Serv., Inc. (In re Rawson Food Service, Inc.), 846 F.2d 1343,
1347 (11th Cir. 1988).
152 See, e.g., Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Charter Int'l Oil Co., 60 B.R. 854, 856 (M.D.
Fla. 1986); Eagle Indus. Truck Mfg., Inc. v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc. (In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc.),
125 B.R. 415, 417 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991).
153 See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2) (2000).
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has received the goods within forty-five days before the commencement of the bankruptcy case and the seller demands reclamation in
writing within forty-five days after the date of receipt of the goods or,
if the forty-five day period expires after the commencement of the
case, within twenty days after the case is commenced. 154 Because debtors are usually insolvent during the forty-five day period, the amendment effectively gives sellers the right to reclaim goods sold on credit
and received by the debtor within forty-five days before bankruptcy. 155
Second, the amendments to section 546(c) delete the reference
to statutory or common-law right of reclamation which, presumably,
was intended to replace nonbankruptcy law regarding reclamation
rights with the rights granted under section 546(c). 15 6 Third, the section 546(c) amendments clarify that a seller's right of reclamation is
subject to prior rights of secured creditors that have security interests
in the goods or the proceeds thereof. 157 This change is not significant
because, under the version of section 546(c) in effect before the 2005
amendments, the seller's rights were subordinated to the rights of a
good-faith purchaser and courts have held that a secured creditor is
such a purchaser. 158 Fourth, the 2005 amendments delete the judicial
option of giving the seller, in lieu of reclamation, either administrative
claim priority or a lien to secure its claim.15 9 Finally, section 546(c), as
amended, provides that if a seller fails to make a timely written demand for reclamation, "the seller still may assert the rights contained
in section 503(b) (9)." 160
To the extent that the debtor still has possession of goods delivered within forty-five days before bankruptcy, and a timely demand
for reclamation is made, the seller would have the right to the return
of the goods. 161 Upon return, of course, the debtor could repurchase
the same or similar goods from the seller, paying for the goods in the
ordinary course of business under section 363(c) (1).162 Postpetition
154 BAPCPA § 1227(a), 119 Stat. at 199-200 (to be codified at, and amending, 11
U.S.C. § 546(c)).
155 See id.
156 See id.
5
1 7 Id.
158 See, e.g., In re Reliable Drug Stores, Inc., 70 F.3d 948, 949 (7th Cir. 1995); Pester Ref.
Co. v. Ethyl Corp. (In re Pester Ref. Co.), 964 F.2d 842, 844-45 (8th Cir. 1992); see also 11
U.S.C. § 546(c).
159See BAPCPA § 1227(a), 119 Stat. at 199-200 (to be codified at, and amending, 11
U.S.C. § 546(c)).
160 Id.
161See id.
162 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (2000).
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purchases are administrative expenses under section 503(b). 163 It is
likely, therefore, that there will be a reduction in the need for courts
to order critical-vendor payments where the vendor has reclamation
rights. Alternatively, courts are likely to be more willing to grant the
debtor authority to pay in full the prepetition claims of critical vendors who have the right to compel the return of goods, whether relying on section 105(a), section 363(b), or the doctrine of necessity as
authority. It is unlikely that courts will require the debtor to return
reclaimed goods only to repurchase them. The practical solution in
such cases is to allow the debtor to pay the prepetition claim for the
purchase price immediately.
C. A BroaderImplication of the 2005 Amendments on Payment of
Critical-VendorClaims
The enactment of section 503(b) (9) may also affect the doctrine
of necessity and critical-vendor payments in another way. As discussed
above, supporters of the doctrine of necessity and judicial authority to
pay critical vendors have argued that the Bankruptcy Code's silence
regarding a doctrine that existed under pre-Code law does not stand
in the way of its recognition after the Code's enactment in 1978.164
The absence of any mention of the doctrine in the Code could be
consistent with its continuing viability. Nevertheless, now that Congress has spoken on the treatment of prepetition unsecured vendor
claims in section 503(b) (9), a broader question that may arise when
debtors request court authorization to pay prepetition critical-vendor
claims is whether the 2005 legislation includes a negative inference. 165
Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code now expressly grants administrative expense priority to vendors under section 503(b) (9).16 The 2005
amendments also give vendors broader reclamation rights that exceed
those afforded to vendors under state law.167 Clearly, the Code is no
longer silent on the authority to pay prepetition unsecured claims be-

Ms11 U.S.C. § 503(b), amended by BAPCPA § 329, 119 Stat. at 101.
SeeVilaplana, supra note 26, at 528.
See BAPCPA § 1227(b), 119 Stat. at 199-200 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b) (9)).
16
6 Id.
167 Compare id. § 1227(a), 119 Stat. at 199-200 (to be codified at, and amending, 11
U.S.C. § 546(c)) (allowing a seller to demand in writing reclamation of goods received by
an insolvent debtor within 45 days of the date of receipt of such goods by the debtor, provided certain conditions are met), with U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (2003) (allowing a seller to reclaim goods received by an insolvent buyer within ten days of receipt).
'6
1I-
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fore confirmation of a plan. The more protection that Congress expressly provides for prepetition vendors, the less likely it will be that
courts will use equitable powers to authorize extraordinary treatment
to vendors who do not qualify for the codified protection. For example, a seller delivers goods twenty-five days before the commencement
of the case and, therefore, is not eligible for administrative priority. If
the goods have been resold to consumers before a reclamation demand is made so that reclamation is not possible, will appellate courts
tolerate a bankruptcy court's exercise of discretion to allow payment
to the seller in full at the commencement of the case? Will courts be
willing to give a provider of services (who is not within the scope of
section 503(b) (9)) essentially the same section 503(b) (9) rights as the
provider of goods by using section 105(a), section 363(b), or the doctrine of necessity? Or will appellate courts view such orders as an inappropriate rewriting of the Code?
VI. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS UNDER PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE

Critics of critical-vendor orders at the early stages of a case have
complained that there are few, if any, procedural safeguards on such
orders.16 First-day motions for authority to pay certain prebankruptcy
claims have been routine in many bankruptcy courts. These motions
have been granted without sufficient notice and opportunity to be
heard. In some cases, such motions are granted before the formation
of a committee of unsecured creditors and with little input from
creditor interests. In reaction to such criticism regarding motions for
relief filed and heard on the first day of a case, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United
States proposed a draft of a new Rule 6003 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure. 169 The preliminary draft of the proposed

168See Patricia L. Barsalou & Zack Mosner, Preferential First-Day Orders: Same Question,
Different Look, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2003, http://www.abiworld.org/Content/Naviga
tionMenu/Publications/OnlineABIjournal/Archivel/ABI-JournalArchives.htm (click on
"2003," then "February," then follow "AFFAIRS OF STATE: Preferential First-day Orders:
Same Question, Different Look" hyperlink).
169Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate,
Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, (Aug. 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
newrulesl.html (click on "Bankruptcy Rule 6003") [hereinafter Draft of Proposed Amendments].
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amendments was published for public comment in August 2005.170
The rule, as amended, would read as follows:
Rule 6003. Interim and Final Relief Immediately Following
the Commencement of the Case-Applications for Employment; Motions for Use, Sale, or Lease of Property; and Motions for Assumptions, Assignments, and Rejections of Executory Contracts
Except to the extent that relief is necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm, the court shall not, within 20
days after the filing of the petition, grant relief regarding the
following:
(b) a motion to use, sell, lease, or otherwise incur an obligation regarding property of the estate, including a motion
to pay all or part of a claim that arose before the filing of the
petition, but not a motion under Rule 4001 .... 171
The Committee Note explaining the purpose of the proposed rule
states:
[t] here can be a flurry of activity during the first days of a
bankruptcy case. This activity frequently takes place prior to
the formation of a creditors' committee, and it also can include substantial amounts of materials for the court and parties in interest to review and evaluate. This rule is intended
to alleviate some of the time pressures present at the start of
a case so that full and close consideration can be given to
172
matters that may have a fundamental impact on the case.
The eventual promulgation of the new Rule 6003 by the Supreme
Court is highly likely, though it probably will not become effective until at least December 1, 2007, because of the lengthy rulemaking process under the Rules Enabling Act.1 73 The result will be greater creditor and committee response to any request by a debtor to pay
prepetition unsecured claims.

170 Id.
171

Id.

172Id.

173 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2000).
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CONCLUSION

The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, which grant
vendors administrative priority for goods delivered within twenty days
before bankruptcy and greater reclamation rights, should reduce the
demand for payments to critical vendors during the early days of a
Chapter 11 case. In those situations where a debtor seeks permission
to pay a vendor's prebankruptcy administrative claim, the court would
have the discretion to grant the request under section 503(b). Nevertheless the 2005 amendments leave uncertain the bankruptcy court's
discretion to provide similar protection for, or to authorize early payment to, creditors with unsecured claims that fall outside the scope of
these new statutory protections.
The recent judicial trend has been to narrow the bankruptcy
court's equitable power to authorize payment of prebankruptcy unsecured claims before confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. Several appellate court decisions have rejected entirely the doctrine of necessity and
the use of section 105(a) to authorize payment of prebankruptcy nonpriority claims, while the Seventh Circuit in In re Kmart Corp. has kept
the door open to the possible use of section 363(b) with strict evidentiary burdens to safeguard against unwarranted payments. 174 Several
bankruptcy courts have provided stringent tests for making criticalvendor payments, such as the three-part test used in In re CoServ, L.L.C.
and In re Mirant Corp.175 Clearly, orders granting debtors wide discretion
to pay prebankruptcy claims of creditors that they perceive as critical to
the reorganization effort will no longer be routine in future cases.
Yet bankruptcy courts should, and likely will, continue the practice of authorizing the payment of prebankruptcy debt in certain
situations, such as when the claim has priority under section 507(a)
and a delay in payment would cause disruption to the debtor's business. Courts probably will rely on the doctrine of necessity, section
105(a), or section 363(b) when granting such orders. For example,
the timely payment of priority wage claims, which now can be as high
as $10,000 per employee, has been, and will continue to be, unchallenged and routine in the majority of Chapter 11 cases. If and when
the proposed new Bankruptcy Rule 6003 becomes effective, it should
be relatively easy for a reorganizing debtor to prove that payment of
priority wage claims during the first days of the case is "necessary to
174359

F.3d 866, 872-73 (7th Cir. 2004).

175 In re Mirant Corp., 296 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003); In re CoServ L.L.C.,

273 B.R. 487, 498 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
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avoid immediate and irreparable harm" so that the court would not
have to wait until twenty days after the commencement of the case to
176
grant the requested relief.
Courts also should have discretion to authorize payment of nonpriority claims, but only in extraordinary circumstances and with procedural safeguards that afford parties in interest an opportunity to be
heard before relief is granted. Anyone who doubts that such authority
should exist should read Official Committee of Equity Security Holders v.
Mabey, where the Fourth Circuit, only because of its view that section
105(a) was insufficient authority on which to rely, shut the door on
the creation of a $15 million emergency treatment fund to be used to
pay the $10,000-$15,000 cost of timely surgery or fertilization for
each victim of a defective contraceptive device. 177 The medical treatment was likely to cure infertility, the expenditure would have
benefited the estate by mitigating tort claims, and the amount spent
on each woman would have been deducted from future plan distributions almost certain to exceed the cost of the medical treatment, so
creation of the treatment fund would not adversely affect distribu178
tions to creditors.
Now that Congress has added section 503(b) (9) to the Code to
grant administrative priority to claims of certain vendors, and has
amended section 546(c) to expand reclamation rights, it should complete its statutory treatment with respect to the payment of prebankruptcy claims before a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed. The Code
should be amended to clarify the extent to which the doctrine of necessity applies in Chapter 11 cases. The legislation would avoid further
uncertainty, as well as expensive and time-consuming litigation, over
the propriety of allowing payment of prebankruptcy debts. It also
would result in more national uniformity (and less forum shopping)
regarding payment of prebankruptcy claims outside of a plan. The
legislation should recognize different standards to be applied depending on the type of debt sought to be paid.
The National Bankruptcy Conference' 79 has proposed the addition of a new section 1117 to the Code dealing with payment of pre176 See Draft

of Proposed Amendments, supra note 169.

177 See 832 F.2d 299, 301-02 (4th Cir. 1987).
178 See

id. at 301.
The National Bankruptcy Conference is a voluntary, non-profit, non-partisan, selfsupporting organization of approximately sixty-five lawyers, law professors, and bankruptcy
judges. Its primary purpose is to study the operation of bankruptcy and related laws and to
make proposals for their reform. The Author is a member of the Conference.
179
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bankruptcy claims before confirmation of a plan. 8° That proposal
would establish a "best interest of the estate" test for the payment of
priority wage claims and contributions to an employee benefit plan
owed to employees, and for payment of customer claims, such as warranty claims and claims based on price discount or frequent flier-type
programs. Apparently, the standard for these claims would be the
same as the standard used whenever the court, under section 363(b),
approves an expenditure outside the ordinary course of business. For
other types of unsecured claims, however, the court would not have

180The following is the proposal:
Section 1117. Payment of Prepetition Claims
(a) After the order for relief, except as provided in section 365, 503, 546,
1110, 1113, 1114, or 1168, subsection (b) or (c) of this section, a plan
confirmed in the case, or the order confirming the plan, the trustee may not
pay an unsecured claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this tide.
(b) The court, on request of the trustee and after notice and a hearing, may
authorize the trustee to pay, or otherwise perform an obligation in connection with, an unsecured claim that arose before the commencement of the
case, whether or not proof of the claim has been filed or deemed filed or the
claim has been allowed, if such payment is in the best interest of the estate
and(1) the claim is owed to an employee of the debtor and is of the kind and
for the amount and time periods specified in section 507(a) (4) or 507(a) (5);
or
(2) the claim arose from the purchase, before the commencement of the
case, of goods or services, or the right to use technology or information, from
the debtor in the ordinary course of business of the debtor, including a claim
based on a warranty, right to a price discount, or right to receive delivery of
goods or services.
(c) The court, on request of the trustee and after notice and a hearing, may
authorize the trustee to pay, or otherwise perform an obligation in connection with, an unsecured claim that arose before the commencement of the
case, other than a claim of the kind specified in subsection (b), whether or
not proof of the claim has been filed or deemed filed or the claim has been
allowed, if(1) there is a compelling public interest in the continuation of the
debtor's business and a material risk that the debtor's business will not continue without such payment or performance;
(2) such payment or performance is necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and the benefit to the estate of such payment or performance substantially outweighs the cost to the estate; or
(3) there is a compelling public interest in such payment or performance
and the benefit to the estate of such payment or performance outweighs the
cost to the estate.
NAT'L BANKR. CONFERENCE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO TITLE

CODE (2005) (on file with author).
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discretion to authorize payment unless there is an evidentiary showing that at least one of the following three more stringent standards is
satisfied: (1) there is a compelling public interest in the continuation
of the debtor's business and a material risk that the debtor's business
will not continue without such payment; (2) the payment is necessary
to permit the reorganization of the debtor and the benefit to the estate of the payment substantially outweighs the cost to the estate; or
(3) there is a compelling public interest in the payment and the
benefit to the estate of such payment or performance outweighs the
181
cost to the estate.
Congress should consider enactment of the National Bankruptcy
Conference proposal or a similar provision on payment of prebankruptcy claims in a Chapter 11 case before confirmation of a plan. If
such a proposal is enacted, and proposed new Rule 6003 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure is promulgated, courts will have
the flexibility they need to authorize payment of a prebankruptcy
claim only when the particular circumstances justify such payment,
and parties in interest will have procedural safeguards to assure a
meaningful opportunity to be heard at the evidentiary hearings.

181The National Bankruptcy Conference also supports the adoption of procedural requirements to assure an opportunity for the creditors' committee, United States trustee,
and other parties in interest to be heard before the court grants an order authorizing
payment of prebankruptcy debt, unless delay in payment would cause immediate and irreparable harm to the estate. It has, however, temporarily deferred proposing a statutory
provision on procedural matters in view of the proposed new Rule 6003 of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

